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ABSTRACT 
Fault tolerance has become an important issue for parallel 
applications in the last few years. The parallel systems’ 
users want them to be reliable considering two main 
dimensions, availability and data consistency.  
Availability can be provided with solutions such as 
RADIC, a fault tolerant architecture with different 
protection levels, offering high availability with 
transparency, decentralization, flexibility and scalability 
for message-passing systems. Transient faults may cause 
an application running in a computer system to be 
removed from execution, however the biggest risk of 
transient faults is to provoke undetected data corruption 
that changes the final result of the application without 
anyone knowing. To evaluate the effects of transient 
faults in the robustness of applications and validate new 
fault detection mechanism and strategies, we have 
developed a full-system simulation fault injection 
environment1. 
Keywords: Fault tolerance, availability, RADIC, 
transient faults, performability. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
To achieve more computing power it is usual to 
aggregate a large number of computing elements. The 
problem of this approach is that the more elements a 
system has, the probability of faults grows. 
Recent trends in High Performance Computing (HPC) 
systems clearly indicate that future increases in 
performance, in addition to those resulting from 
improvements in multicore processor performance, will 
be achieved through corresponding increases in system 
scale. This growth in system scale, and the resulting 
component count, poses a challenge for HPC system and 
application software with respect to fault tolerance. 
Fault tolerance has become an important issue for parallel 
applications running in parallel computer in the last few 
years. The miniaturization and the growth of the number 
of components, which form parallel machines, are the 
major root cause of the failures increasingly seen on these 
machines. The parallel machines’ users want them to be 
reliable. Whereas availability refers to a system being in 
service, reliability refers to it performing correctly. Thus, 
there exists a fundamental distinction between reliable 
items and available items. When a reliable item fails, its 
                                                          
1 This work is supported by the MEC-Spain under contract 
TIN2007-64974 
life ends. When an available item fails, it can be repaired 
or otherwise returned to service after a relatively short 
down time. An available item oscillates all its life 
between the states "up" (working) and "down" (out of 
service) (Figure 1) 
The improvement in computer reliability obtained by 
traditional methods is considered insufficient in many 
new installations, especially since computers are 
increasingly being used continuously and efficiently, a 
reliability increase can only be achieved by embedding 
redundant elements.  
In order for the execution to complete correctly, parallel 
systems should use some fault tolerance strategy. In any 
case it is important to note that even with fault tolerance 
strategies, service interruptions (a complete stop of the 
program execution) may occur if data inconsistency or 
the system degradation generated by the faults reaches an 
unacceptable level. We will analyze some of the software 
methods that let parallel computers perform their 
intended function or at least keep their environment safe 
in spite of internal faults in hardware (persistent or hard, 
transient or soft errors including silent errors that can 
produce data inconsistency). 
Figure 1. Reliable and available system  
 
From a user’s point of view, fault tolerance effects have 
two dimensions, availability and data consistency, as 
shown in Figure 2. Without fault tolerance, the execution 
is interrupted by one fault, but when fault tolerance is 
provided, the system can be maintained available with  
higher or lower degradation and with the possibility of 
detecting silent error reducing possible data 
inconsistency. 
Fault tolerance represents a key issue in order to provide 
high availability in these parallel systems, because it 
Figure 2. Fault tolerant effects 
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provides fault detection, protection and recovery. Fault 
tolerance can be provided in a parallel computer at three 
different levels [10]: hardware level, architecture level 
and application/system software level. The scope of this 
paper is in the application /system software level, where 
checkpointing techniques and rollback recovery are 
widely used to provide fault tolerance. As shown in 
Figure 3, there are different rollback-recovery protocols 
which can be useful to assure the application completion 
[6] [11]. The absence of a global clock in clusters makes 
it difficult to initiate checkpoints in all the streams of 
execution at the same time instance. We can use 
coordinated checkpointing or a message logging protocol. 
 
A fault-tolerant system has the unique property that its 
overall reliability is higher than the reliability of its 
constituting parts. The secret of fault tolerance is how to 
structure these redundant components so that the failure 
of one does not bring the whole system down. 
In order to achieve high availability, the challenges of a 
fault-tolerant system are to provide automatic and 
transparent fault detection, protection and recovery, 
which implies the evaluation of the appropriate quality 
indexes, as modeled in Figure 4. In addition we impose 
the constraint that the implementation of the proposed 
mechanisms will be done using only software solutions 
without requiring additional dedicated hardware. 
Assuming a hypothesis that the effective performance of 
a high performance computer depends on its availability 
and that providing high availability implies a 
performance overhead, the study of the root causes of 
such overhead is necessary, including the performance 
degradation caused by faults. 
Considering all these aspects, we proposed and developed 
RADIC (Redundant Array of Distributed Independent 
Fault Tolerance Controllers). RADIC is an architecture 
for providing Fault Tolerance (FT) in message-passing 
systems offering high availability with transparency, 
decentralization, flexibility and scalability for standard 
computer clusters with some node-local storage (hard 
disk, solid state disks –SSD- or partially dedicated main 
memory). 
 
With the objective of analyzing transient faults effects’ in 
computer systems’ processor registers and memory, we 
have also developed an extension of COTSon [1], the 
HP’s and AMD joint full system simulation environment. 
This extension allows the injection of faults that can 
change a single bit in processor registers and memory of 
the simulated computer. The developed fault injection 
system makes it possible to: evaluate the effects of single 
bit flip transient faults in an application, analyze the 
robustness of application against single bit flip transient 
faults and validate fault detection mechanism and 
strategies. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The 
next section presents the basic concepts. Section 3 
explains the protection levels currently implemented in 
RADIC architecture with some experimental results 
relating to them. More experimental results and the 
experimental environment are presented in section 4 and 
in section 5 we present a tool for analyzing soft errors, 
including silent errors that can produce data 
inconsistency. Finally, in section 6 we present our 
conclusions and future work. 
 
2. FAULTS IN PARALLEL COMPUTERS: 
PROTECTION, DETECTION AND 
RECUPERATION 
Computer clusters may be considered as a class of 
computing systems with degradable performance [13] 
i.e., under some circumstances during a determined 
utilization period, the system may present different 
performance levels. Such performance degradation is 
generally caused by faults occurrence, which may also 
affect the system availability if they have generated an 
interruption.  
In order to achieve high availability, a fault-tolerant 
system must provide automatic and transparent fault 
detection, protection and recovery (Figure 5).  
Until now, different efforts have been focused on 
providing high availability to computer clusters [3], [9]. 
The solutions resulting from these efforts are commonly 
based on rollback-recovery redundancy techniques [2], 
[4] and they have shown their efficacy in improving 
computer cluster performance and availability. In the 
Figure 3. Rollback-recovery protocols tree in message-passing 
systems  
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process of design and implementation it is necessary to 
take decisions that affect the trade-off between cost 
(resource use), performance and availability.  
 
There is a correlation between performance and 
availability, such correlation is also known as 
performability. The fault tolerance mechanisms generate 
some kind of performance overhead because of their 
related activities, such as process state saving, messages 
exchange logging or system health monitoring. 
Performability, as the property of a computer system to 
deliver the performance required even though there are 
faults, is considered as a realistic, complete and accurate 
index for evaluating degradable systems such as 
computer clusters (Figure 6). 
 
 
Time To Failure (TTF) expresses the time to a fault or an 
error, even though it refers specifically to failures. Mean 
Time To Failure (MTTF) of a component expresses the 
amount of time elapsed between the last system startup or 
restart and then next error of the component. How these 
factors are involved in availability evaluation is shown in 
Figure 7. MTTF of a component is commonly expressed 
in years and it is obtained based on an averaged 
estimative of failure prediction done by the component’s 
supplier. 
Solutions to ensure a large MTTI (Mean Time To 
Interrupt) must also provide the means to restore the 
original system configuration (initial number of 
replacement nodes, or the process per node distribution) 
without stopping a running application. In addition to 
“reactive fault tolerance” (activities after a fault), it is 
also very desirable that it should perform preventive 
maintenance tasks by, for example, replacing fault-
probable machines without system interruptions 
(Proactive Migration). 
 
A repairable item is defined by its availability. Stationary 
availability (A) is defined as the ratio between the sum of 
all operating times (MUT) and the useful lifetime 
(MUT+MDT). 
When faults are taken into consideration, and these faults 
degrade the system’s performance, performability 
measurements can be applied to evaluate a system in the 
presence of faults. Figure 8 depicts a chart exemplifying 
the throughput of an application, executed in an “on-line 
repairable” fault tolerant system, when single or 
concurrent faults occur against different degrees of 
availability (including no fault tolerance). This fault 
tolerance solution is characterized by keeping the system 
working but with the performance degraded. In this 
context, time constrained applications may not produce 
the expected results before their deadlines. In some cases, 
the degradation may reach unacceptable levels, leading to 
the need to perform a safe-stop and restart the entire 
system. Furthermore, the kind of fault uncovered by the 
availability degree may occur, interrupting the system, 
i.e., correlated faults when the availability degree only 
protects the system from single faults. 
  
  
Figure 8: Throughput of an application in the presence of faults 
with different Fault Tolerance levels 
 
Undetected errors, either hard or soft, are due to the lack 
of detectors for a component or the inability to detect it 
(e.g. transient effect too short). The real danger of 
Figure 5. Actions in fault tolerant systems 
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undetected errors is that answers may be incorrect but the 
user wouldn’t know it and they can also produce data 
inconsistency. 
There are only a few publications showing evidence the 
occurrence of soft errors. The first evidence of soft errors 
were caused by contamination in the chips production in 
late 70’s and 80’s. Since 2000’s, the reports of soft errors 
in large computer installations such as supercomputers 
and server farms are becoming more frequent. This 
happens because the number of components in this kind 
of installations is very large (thousands of CPU and 
terabytes of memory) and the powerful multi/many-core 
processors exhibit a high level of miniaturization (high 
density of transistors) and in consequence they are 
potentially less robust against transient faults. In Figure 9 
(adapted from [12]) the possible outcomes of bit flip in a 
computer processor or memory are described. 
Figure 9: Classification of possible outcomes of a transient fault  
 
For those systems requiring continuous operation over 
long times, having an “on-line repair mechanism” 
without disruption of the operation, with or without 
degradation of operation, is a key feature. Automatic 
reconfiguration can fail in case the of a second fault in 
the working units when it does not support simultaneous 
non correlated concurrent faults, although the presence of 
a maintenance system could reduces reliability, because 
of additional components. To deal with correlated 
concurrent faults requires more redundant elements. 
 
3. THE RADIC ARCHITECTURE 
RADIC (Redundant Array of Distributed Fault Tolerance 
Controllers) [4] is a fully fault tolerant architecture for 
message-passing parallel computers, providing high 
availability for parallel applications with transparency, 
decentralization, flexibility and scalability. 
Our approach creates a “fully distributed controller” to 
manage faults in the nodes of the parallel computer. This 
controller contains two collections of dedicated 
processes, named protectors (P) and observers (O) 
(Figure 10), which collaborate to execute the fundamental 
tasks of a transparent fault tolerant scheme based on 
rollback-recovery: state saving, fault detection, recovery 
and fault masking. RADIC applies the uncoordinated 
checkpoint message-logging receiver-based technique for 
fault tolerance. The P and O processes collaborate as a 
fully distributed “parallel fault-tolerant manager” to 
automatically perform all activities required to ensure the 
correct ending of the parallel application in spite of 
failures in some nodes of the cluster. 
 
The set of observers (O) attached to the application 
processes, manage all delivered messages between 
application processes. Each observer also supports the 
checkpoint operation (chk) and the message-log 
mechanisms for the application process to which it is 
attached. The set of protectors (T) performs the failure 
detection task (Heartbeat–watchdog), operating like a 
distributed storage mechanism for the checkpoints and 
message-logs, and also recovering faulty processes. 
The RADIC architecture acts as a layer between the fault-
probable cluster structure and the message-passing library 
implementation. Such a layer performs fault-masking 
(message-delivering) and fault tolerance (checkpoint, 
event logs, fault detection and recovery) tasks. 
 RADIC is based on rollback-recovery techniques 
applying a pessimistic event-log approach. Such an 
approach was chosen because it does not need any 
coordinated or centralized action in order to provide its 
functionality, and as a consequence does not limit or 
reduce RADIC’s scalability. RADIC considers any 
absence of expected communication as a fault but it can 
tolerates short transient faults by retrying the 
communication.  
RADIC offers different protection levels, see Figure 11. 
In the Basic Protection level, RADIC operates without 
the need for any passive resource in order to provide its 
functionalities, using some active node of the 
configuration to recover a failed process which could lead 
to performance degradation. This protection level is well-
suited for short-running applications, or applications that 
may tolerate resource loss, such as the dynamicly load 
balanced ones. 
The High Availability level fits applications demanding a 
non-stop behavior. At this level, RADIC provides a 
flexible dynamic redundancy through a transparent 
management of spare nodes. This protection level avoids 
the system configuration change by incorporating 
transparent management of spares nodes. Moreover, it is 
possible to dynamically insert new replacement nodes 
during the program execution, allowing replacement of 
used spares or failed nodes. Such a feature increases the 
MTTI of the parallel application once the number of idle 
spare nodes remains constant, as it is shown in Figure 12. 
Figure 10. Example the RADIC architecture in a cluster. The 
arrows indicate the relationship between observers (O) and 
protectors (T). 
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 The Proactive migration fault tolerance is a useful 
characteristic in continuous running applications, where 
preventive maintenance stops are undesirable, so it 
became necessary to offer a mechanism allowing the 
performance of non-stop maintenance tasks [14]. 
The standard configuration of RADIC provides a 
protection degree which can tolerates several 
simultaneous non-correlated faults but if some 
component of the RADIC controller fails while that 
element is involved in the recovery of a fault, e.g. an 
observer and its respective protector, then the standard 
configuration is unable to support both faults. 
 To deal with this kind of correlated-concurrent faults, the 
RADIC architecture may be configured to increase the 
protection degree using more than one protector (P) for 
each application process, this is the Protect multiple 
faults level. 
The flexibility of RADIC offers the possibility of 
modifying its configurations in order to accomplish the 
user’s requirements. RADIC permits the user to modify 
the checkpoint interval, observer/protector mapping, 
number of copies of each process, number and logical 
location of spare nodes, and the heartbeat/watchdog 
interval [8]. 
The RADIC architecture has been tested using a 
prototype called RADICMPI [5] and more recently a new 
version has been implemented over Open MPI [7] called 
RADIC/OMPI.  
 
4. AVAILABILITY AND PERFORMANCE 
Performability could be understood as the correlation 
between performance and availability when a rollback-
recovery pessimistic message log-based fault tolerance 
protocol is applied into a computer cluster based on the 
message-passing model.  
The root factors influencing the performability when 
using the RADIC fault tolerance architecture include: 1) 
redundant data replication (checkpoints and logs), 2) 
message delivery latency, because of the use of 
pessimistic logging and 3) process migration due to faulty 
nodes, because this can produce performance 
degradation. 
 
 
Figure 13. High Availability Protection Level: Results of an N-
Body simulation after three faults are recovered in: spare nodes. 
 
To analyze the impact of RADIC on system performance, 
it is necessary to measure the generated overhead in 
applications with different communication to 
computation ratio, because low or high ratios have 
different effects on the overhead. Execution Time also 
depends on the number of faults and the protection level.  
In order to analyze the influence of RADIC on 
application performance, three class-D applications from 
Figure 11. RADIC  protection levels 
 
(a) 
(b) 
Figure 12. Results of an N-Body simulation after three faults are 
recovered in: (a) different nodes and (b) the same node. 
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the NAS benchmarks have been used: BT, LU and SP. 
These applications have been select due to their different 
communication to computation ratios. To evaluate the 
optimal checkpoint interval (I), we selected the 
equation          [10]. Where k0 is the time spent 
creating and transferring checkpoint, and α is the 
probability of failure. Table 1 presents the calculated 
checkpoint intervals used to execute the above mentioned 
class-D NAS applications. In Figure 14 we can observe 
the overhead introduced by the message logging 
operation in some class C and D NAS applications, with 
and without RADIC and in the presence of faults. 
Depending on the application’s communication to 
computation ratio the message logging can or cannot be 
completely overlapped with computation. 
Table 1. Checkpoint intervals used to execute class-D NAS 
applications. Values are expressed in minutes and megabytes.  
Applications: 
BT, LU, SP.  
# Nodes Running 
time (m) 
Process 
size (MB) 
Checkpoint 
interval (m) 
BT D 16  43,79  1980  21,58 
BT D 25  29,58  1400  16,28  
SP D 16  55,01  1715  19,17  
SP D 25  40,82  1251  14,90  
LU D 8  103,84  1747  19,46  
LU D 16  40,69  1061  13,13  
LU D 32  20,63  722  9,91  
 
 
Figure 14. Execution time of class C and D NAS applications 
while using Open MPI with and without RADIC fault tolerance 
  
5. SOFT ERROR AND DATA 
CONSISTENCY 
Computer chip implementation technologies evolving to 
obtain more performance are increasing the probability of 
transient faults. The transient faults are those that may 
occur once and will not happen again the same way in the 
lifetime of that system. Transient faults in computer 
systems may occur in processor, memory, internal buses 
and devices, often resulting in an inversion in the state of 
a bit (single bit flip) at the fault location. Transient faults 
in computer systems are commonly the effect of cosmic 
radiation, high operating temperatures and variations in 
the power supply subsystem. 
Transient faults may cause an application running in a 
computer system to be removed from execution (fail-
stop) by the operating system when the change produced 
by the fault is detected by the processor or the operating 
system based on bad behavior of the application. In this 
case the transient fault would cause an application to 
misbehave (e.g. write into an invalid memory position; 
attempt to execute an inexistent instruction) which will 
then be abruptly interrupted by the operating system fail-
stop mechanism. However, perhaps the biggest risk for 
applications is that transient faults provoke undetected 
data corruption and change the final result of the 
application, without anyone knowing. This data 
corruption happens when the transient fault bit-flip 
generates an incorrect final result that might not ever be 
noticed [12]. 
The risk of having transient faults affecting computation 
resulted in the need for researchers to have tools to 
simulate those faults to study their effects and also to test 
their theories and proposals. Since transient faults occur 
in a very unpredictable way, an environment with 
transient bit-level fault injection capabilities is needed to 
study the effects of these faults in the computer hardware 
stack (processor, buses, memory, etc) as well as the 
software stack (operating systems, middleware and 
applications) 
As was mentioned in the introduction, we have developed 
an environment with single bit-level register level fault 
injection capabilities, based on COTSon [1]. 
The fault injection “campaign” description used in the 
environment only needs the value of three parameters to 
inject fault into a computer system simulation: a fault 
trigger, a fault location and a fault operation.  
It is important to have an environment able to perform 
fault injection experiments in order to: 
 Evaluate the effects of single bit flip transient faults 
on processor registers and memory on applications; 
 Analyze application robustness against single bit flip 
transient faults on processor registers and memory; 
 Test fault detection mechanisms: Be able to analyze 
the effectiveness of a fault injection through the 
application fault detection mechanism; 
Our environment uses a full system simulator and allows 
both deterministic and non-deterministic fault injections 
campaigns and generates enough information about the 
fault injection to help in the further analysis necessary to 
build a better understanding of the effects of a transient 
fault in applications robustness and behavior. 
By selecting a full system simulator as an environment to 
inject faults we also could achieve both precision and 
accuracy by having full control of the simulated computer 
processor. 
With our fault injection environment we achieve a very 
transparent fault injection environment, as dealing with 
fault injection it isn't necessary to change the simulated 
computer operating system or the tested application. 
With the developed environment, we were able to show 
evidence of the influence of compiler optimizations in the 
robustness of an application and of a fault detection 
mechanism against transient faults (Figure 15). 
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 Figure 15. Some plot of the developed environment showing the 
impact generated in the application provoked injecting transient 
faults in different registers 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The growth in HPC system scale poses a challenge in the 
design of automatic and transparent strategies and 
mechanisms to perform fault protection, detection and 
recovery. To evaluate the performance of these systems 
in the presence of faults, performability, the property of a 
computer system to deliver the performance required 
even though there are faults, is considered a realistic, 
complete and accurate index. RADIC, a fault tolerant 
architecture with different protection levels, can provide 
high availability with transparency, decentralization, 
flexibility and scalability for message-passing systems. 
The flexibility of RADIC offers the possibility of 
modifying its configurations in order to accomplish the 
user’s requirements. 
An increasing risk for applications is that transient faults, 
through silent errors, provoke undetected data corruption 
and change the final result of the application, without 
anyone knowing. We have developed a fault injection 
system for evaluating the effects of single transient faults 
in an application, analyzing the robustness of applications 
against these transient faults and validating new fault 
detection mechanisms and strategies. 
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